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11 
12 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
13 This court has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to Section 35-1-
14 86, U.C.A., (1953, as amended). 
15 STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
16 
17 1. Whether the respondent's stipulation with Stoddard while represented 
18 by counsel and after approval of the commission bars his later re-application for 
19 benefits for the same cause. 
20 2. Whether the applicant was acting within the course of his employment 
21 at the time of the injury. 
22 
1 
1 DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY OR CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
2 Section 35-1-90; Rule R568-1-16; Wilburn vs. Interstate Electric, 748 P2d 
3 582 (Utah, App., 1988). 
4 
5 STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
6 Respondent Gregory Lynn Biddle received injuries which he claimed were 
7 in the course of his employment with Petitioner. Petitioner/employer filed a 
8 response claiming that respondent was not within the course of his employment at 
9 the time of the injury. Just prior to a hearing on the matter in 1991, the parties 
10 settled the matter by the Petitioner agreeing to pay the sum of $5,100 toward 
11 respondent's medical expenses. A Stipulation to that effect was submitted 
12 providing for a dismissal with prejudice. The Commission through the ALJ 
13 approved the settlement. Thereafter in 1993, respondent once again applied for 
14 benefits in the same matter. A hearing was held and the ALJ determined that 
15 the Stipulation was not binding, the respondent was acting in the course of his 
16 employment at the time of the injury and granted benefits. The ALJ further 
17 determined that the employer had no funds to pay the award and ordered the 
18 Uninsured fund to cover the amounts due. The portion of the decision dealing 
19 with the Stipulation and the question as to whether claimant was acting within the 
,0 course of his employment was appealed by both the Uninsured fund and the 
1 Petitioner. The commission upheld the determination that the earlier Stipulation 
I was not binding on the respondent even though he was represented by . isei 
2 
1 and further upheld the finding that the respondent was acting in the course of his 
2 employment at the time of the injury. 
3 
4 STATEMENT OF FACTS 
5 The facts which are relevant to a determination of this case on appeal are 
6 as follows: 
7 1. In the fall of 1989, the applicant, Gregory Lynn Biddle, went to work 
8 for the defendant, Franklin Lynn Stoddard, dba Water Well & Exploration 
9 Drilling (p. 15, line 2). 
10 2. Stoddard drills wells on agricultural properties for agricultural and farm 
11 culinary purposes (p. 29, lines 14-25; p. 30 lines 1-12). 
12 3. Mr, Biddle was only hired to work on certain specific drilling sites and 
13 Stoddard paid him only for the time that he was at the site (p. 27, lines 17-24; p. 
14 28, lines 17-20). 
15 4. On June 4, 1990, Stoddard gave Biddle a ride to work. They stopped 
16 on the way because Stoddard wanted to give one of his cousins a hand setting up 
17 a drill rig. Biddle decided that he, too, would lend a hand and give Stoddard's 
18 cousin a hand setting up the drill rig (p. 28, lines 7-23). 
19 5. While Biddle was helping Stoddard's cousin, he crushed his ring and 
20 middle fingers of his left hand (p. 18, lines 12-15). 
21 6. In October, 1990, Biddle and his attorney, one Gregory Skabelund, filed 
22 an application for hearing claiming that Biddle was entitled to payment of medical 
3 
1 expenses incurred as a result of the accident, temporary total compensation, and 
2 permanent total disability (record index pps 1-6). 
3 7. Stoddard vigorously contested the application, retained counsel and 
4 filed an answer to the application on November 13, 1990 (record index pps 8-9). 
5 8. Biddle claimed he could not work from June 4, 1990 to October 15, 
6 1990. 
7 9. On June 11, 1991, one of the Commission's administrative law judges 
8 mailed a letter to counsel for Stoddard (record index p . 11). It stated: 
9 "This letter is a follow-up of the above matter. Our file indicates 
10 that the matter would be settled for $5,100 in medical expenses, and 
11 a stipulation was to be forwarded to our office so we might close 
12 our file. I would appreciate a copy of the Stipulation so we may 
13 conclude our involvement." 
14 10. After that, both parties and their lawyers signed a stipulation. It is on 
15 file in the Commission's record and states, in pertinent part (records index pps 12-
16 14), 
17 "The parties in the above entitled action, hereby stipulate that W. 
18 Franklin Stoddard dba Water Well and Exploration Drilling will pay 
19 the medical expenses of the Applicant, Gregory Lynn Biddle, in a 
J20 sum not to exceed $5,100. 
ll Following said payment, applicant agrees that this action shall be dismissed 
22 with prejudice." 
33 An order was appended to the stipulation. One of the Commission's 
24 administrative law judges signed the order which read: 
25 "IT IS H E R E B Y O R D E R E D that pursuant to the above 
26 stipulation, that W. Franklin Stoddard dba Water Well Exploration 
\1 Drilling pay all of Applicant's uninsured medical expenses incurred 
18 as a result of the industrial accident dated the 4th of June, 1990, as 
9 outlined below up to $5,100: ..." 
4 
1 11. It is undisputed that the full $5,100 was paid as agreed in the 
2 Stipulation and in fact, Mr. Stoddard testified that he had to borrow sufficient 
3 funds to pay the settlement and that he is still not finished paying that loan back 
4 (p. 31, lines 16-18). In the Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion 
5 for Review issued by the Commission on October 28, 1993, the commission 
6 mistakenly believed that there was a misunderstanding or dispute as to the 
7 amount of medical bills. There in fact was no misunderstanding. The parties 
8 realized at the hearing where the matter was resolved that the medicals would be 
9 more than the $5,100 by some unknown amount (p. 43, lines 5-14). Mr. Biddle 
10 agreed to settle for the $5,100 and that is why the stipulation specifically provided 
11 that the medicals were to be paid "in a sum not to exceed $5,100". The figures 
12 for medical expenses set forth on the settlement document itself come to more 
13 than the $5,100. Had Mr. Biddle settled for full payment of all medical expenses 
14 by Mr. Stoddard, the Stipulation would have not had a cap, but would have 
15 provided that all medical expenses were to be paid by Mr. Stoddard. Because 
16 liability really was an issue in good faith, Mr. Biddle agreed to settle for less than 
17 his actual medical expenses and he did this upon the advice of and with 
18 representation of counsel. 
19 12. On July 14, 1992, some two years after the accident, Biddle filed a 
20 second application for hearing (record index p 36). He claimed that he was 
21 entitled to payment for temporary total compensation, medical expenses and 
22 permanent partial disability suffered as a result of the accident. 
5 
1 13. On February 3, 1993, one of the Commission's administrative law 
2 judges held a hearing on the second application with the result as reflected in the 
3 record. In the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order issued as a result 
4 of that hearing, the administrative law judge stated that "The prior application for 
5 hearing did not result in a hearing, because the matter was settled pursuant to a 
6 settlement agreement approved by another ALJ in July of 1991." (record index p. 
7 44-52) 
8 
9 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
10 When an applicant settles a workers compensation claim brought in the 
11 Industrial Commission, is represented by counsel and the agreement is approved 
12 by the Commission, that settlement should be final and not subject to reopening 
13 by the applicant who may later decide he was misadvised by counsel or that he 
14 had not wisely settled the matter. 
15 Further, it is clear from the evidence before the commission that the 
16 respondent was not working for Petitioner at the time of his injury, but instead 
17 took it upon himself to assist Petitioner's cousin. He did so on his own and not in 
18 response to any request of Petitioner. Under those circumstances, Petitioner 
19 should not be responsible for any injury to Respondent. 
>0 
1 
2 
6 
1 ARGUMENT 
2 AT THE TIME OF HIS INJURY, THE APPUCANT WAS ARGUABLY NOT 
3 WITHIN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT 
4 The Uninsured Employer's fund in an earlier memorandum in this matter 
5 correctly pointed out that the accident must be one "arising out of and in the 
6 course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred. . " (Section 35-1-43, 
7 UCA, 1953, as amended) 
8 It was Mr. Biddle's burden at the hearing to prove this fact. 
9 It was undisputed that when Biddle was injured, he was not working at 
10 Stoddard's well site. Biddle knew this was not the well he was being taken to 
11 work on. In spite of this knowledge, Biddle voluntarily and without being asked, 
12 decided to help Mr. Stoddard's cousin with his rig and was injured. 
13 Biddle was arguably acting outside of his employment relationship when his 
14 injury occurred and this is not a compensable accident. It is also arguable that 
15 Petitioner was an agricultural employer not covered by the statute. 
16 
17 TOE RESPONDENTS STIPULATION TO A DISMISSAL OF HIS 
18 FIRST APPLICATION FOR HEARING BARS THE LATER 
19 APPLICATION FOR BENEFITS. 
20 
21 The starting point for the analysis of this point is Wilburn vs. Interstate 
22 Electric, 748 P.2d 582 (Utah. App., 1988). In Wilburn the applicant suffered an 
7 
1 on the job injury to his back, for which his employer, Interstate Electric, and the 
2 Employers Reinsurance Fund paid him permanent partial disability benefits. 
3 Wilburn later concluded that he was permanently totally disabled as a result of 
4 the injury and made a claim against his former employer for benefits. The 
5 employer's lawyer told Wilburn that if he persisted with the claim, they would 
6 resist and raise a number of defenses, among them that there had been no 
7 accident. Wilburn, unrepresented by counsel, then agreed to settle for some 
8 additional permanent partial disability. Approximately three years later, Wilburn 
9 filed an application for permanent, total compensation. Interstate Electric raised 
10 as a bar to Wilburn's permanent total claim the earlier settlement agreement. 
11 The administrative law judge initially ruled against Interstate Electric, 
12 finding that there was "no doubt" in his mind as to the compensability of 
13 Wilburn's accident. Interstate moved for review and the A U reversed himself 
14 finding that there was a bona fide dispute regarding as to the defendant's liability 
15 and upheld the settlement agreement. The commission affirmed the ALJ and 
16 Wilburn appealed to the Court of Appeals. 
\1 The Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission, and announced that the 
18 test for determining the validity of a settlement agreement was, in essence, a 
19 subjective one. Although the Court of Appeals, like the AU, said it would have 
20 no problem finding Wilburn's claim compensable, nonetheless, it would not 
\l impose its after the fact judgment on the parties. 
2 
8 
1 "While we would have no difficulty in finding the applicant's claim 
2 compensable, we agree with the administrative law judge that this 
3 determination cannot 'supplant the judgment of those who earlier, in good 
4 faith, viewed this claim as one of doubtful compensability. Since there is 
5 sufficient evidence to support the judge's finding that the parties had a 
6 good faith dispute as to the compensability of the claim, we defer to that 
7 determination. In view of that finding, Section 35-1-90 is no bar to 
8 enforceability of the agreement." 748 P.2d at 586-587. (emphasis added) 
9 
10 The Commission has adopted a rule, R568-1-16, which governs settlement 
11 agreements in worker's compensation claims. In its entirety it reads: 
12 
13 "A. Section 35-1-90, LLC A., invalidates any agreement which requires an 
14 employee to waive his rights. Settlement agreements are appropriate, 
15 however, when the parties, in good faith, view the claim as one of doubtful 
16 compensability. 
17 B. In determining if a claim is of doubtful compensability, the 
18 Commission will look to the facts of the matter and will not be bound by 
19 mere recitations in the settlement agreement. 
20 C. The Commission encourages the settlement of disputed claims on 
21 an amicable basis whenever possible. If the claim is not of doubtful 
22 compensability, the settlement agreement must be open-ended to the 
9 
1 extent allowed under the Workers' Compensation Act. Parties will be 
2 bound by their agreement to pay and receive a given amount of 
3 compensation for a given injury. 
4 D. Settlement agreements involving claims of doubtful compensability 
5 shall be subject to approval by the Commission. 
6 E. The agreement shall be final and not subject to further review upon 
7 the same facts merely because of subsequent dissatisfaction. 
8 F. The Commission shall suggest a format for use by parties desirous 
9 of settling claims of doubtful compensability." 
10 
11 The final sentence of paragraph A of the rule is taken almost word for 
12 word from the quoted portion of Wilburn and indicates that such agreements are 
13 appropriate if the parties in good faith view the claim as one of disputed validity. 
14 Critically, the rule states that the agreement is subject to approval by the 
15 commission and that it is final and not subject to review upon the same facts 
16 merely because of "subsequent dissatisfaction". The original administrative law 
17 judge's letter of June 11, 1991 clearly indicates his understanding that payment of 
18 $5,100 in medical expenses would settle the matter and the file would be closed. 
19 The administrative law judge signed the order approving the parties' stipulation. 
20 The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and order that is the subject of this 
21 motion for review states,, "The prior application for hearing did not result in a 
22 
10 
1 hearing, because the matter was settled pursuant to a settlement agreement 
2 approved by another ALT in July of 1991." (Order, page 1. emphasis added.) 
3 Paragraph E of R568-1-16 bars any further review of the agreement. Clearly, the 
4 order awarding additional benefits to Biddle was in error. 
5 The Industrial Commission is bound by its rule which states that settlement 
6 agreements are not subject to review because of later dissatisfaction. 
7 Administrative agencies must follow their own rules. In State vs. Utah Merit 
8 System Council, 614 P.2d 1259 (Utah, 1980), the Supreme Court stated,,"... 
9 administrative regulations are presumed to be reasonable and valid and cannot be 
10 ignored or followed by the agency to suit its own purposes. Such is the essence of 
11 arbitrary and capricious action. Without compelling grounds for not following its 
12 rules, an agency must be held to them." 614 P.2d at 1263. 
13 Finally, it should be remembered that the applicant was represented by a 
14 lawyer at the time he signed the stipulation agreeing to a dismissal of his 
15 application for hearing. Biddle now says that he didn't know what he was doing. 
16 If that is the case, and it sounds suspiciously like buyer's remorse, the fact that he 
17 had legal counsel who presumptively advised him of the consequences of his act, 
18 he should not now be able to come in and claim ignorance. 
19 
20 CONCLUSION 
21 Under Wilburn and under R568-1-16, the parties earlier settlement of Mr. 
22 Biddle's claim is binding, further, respondent was not an employee of Petitioner at 
11 
1 the time of his injury and this appeal should be granted, and the Court of Appeals 
2 should enter its order reversing the order of the Industrial Commission awarding 
3 additional benefits to the applicant. 
4 Dated this 14th day of December, 1994. 
5 
6 
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10 
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1 
2 
3 SECTION 35-1-86, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
4 
5 The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to review, reverse, or annul any order of 
6 the commission, or to suspend or delay the operation or execution of any order. 
7 as last amended by Chapter 72, Laws of Utah 1988 
8 
9 
10 
11 SECTION 35-1-43, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
12 
13 35-1-43. "Employee," "worker" or "workmen," and "operative" defined -
14 Mining lessees and sublessees - Partners and sole proprietors - Corporate 
15 officers and directors - Real estate agents and brokers. 
16 
17 (1) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" or "workmen," and "operative" 
18 mean: 
19 (a) each elective and appointive officer and any other person, in the 
20 service of the state, or of any county, city, town, or school district within the state, 
21 serving the state, or any county, city, town, or school district under any election or 
22 appointment, or under any contract of hire, express or implied, written or oral, 
23 including each officer and employee of the state institutions of learning and 
24 members of the National Guard while on state active duty; and 
25 (b) each person in the service of any employer, as defined in Section 
26 35-1-42, who employs one or more workers or operatives regularly in the same 
27 business, or in or about the same establishment, under any contract of hire, 
28 express or implied, oral or written, including aliens and minors, whether legally or 
29 illegally working for hire, but not including any person whose employment is 
30 casual and not in the usual course of the trade, business, or occupation of his 
31 employer. 
32 (2) Unless a lessee provides coverage as an employer under this chapter, any 
33 lessee in mines or of mining property and each employee and sublessee of the 
34 lessee shall be covered for compensation by the lessor under this chapter, and 
35 shall be subject to this chapter and entitled to its benefits to the same extent as if 
36 they were employees of the lessor drawing such wages as are paid employees for 
37 substantially similar work. The lessor may deduct from the proceeds of ores 
38 mined by the lessees an amount equal to the insurance premium for that type of 
39 work. 
40 (3) (a) A partnership or sole proprietorship may elect to include as an 
41 employee under this chapter any partner of the partnership or the owner of the 
42 sole proprietorship. If a partnership or sole proprietorship makes this election, it 
43 shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier and upon the commission 
44 naming the persons to be covered. No partner of a partnership or owner of a sole 
13 
1 proprietorship is considered an employee under this chapter until this notice has 
2 been given. For premium rate making, the insurance carrier shall assume the 
3 salary or wage of the employee to be 150% of the state's average weekly wage. 
4 (b) A corporation may elect not to include any director or officer of the 
5 corporation as an employee under this chapter. If a corporation makeb this 
6 election, it shall serve written notice upon its insurance carrier and upon me 
7 commission naming the persons to be excluded from coverage. A director or 
8 officer of a corporation is considered an employee under this chapter until this 
9 notice has been given. 
10 (4) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" or "workman," and "operative" 
11 do not include a real estate agent or real estate broker, as defined in Section 
12 61-2-2, who performs services in that capacity for a real estate broker if: 
13 (a) substantially all of the real estate agent's or associated broker's 
14 income for services is from real estate commissions; 
15 (b) the services of the real estate agent or associated broker are 
16 performed under a written contract specifying that the real estate agent is an 
17 independent contractor; and 
18 (c) the contract states that the real estate agent or associated broker is 
19 not to be treated as an employee for federal income tax purposes. 
20 (5) As used in this chapter, "employee," "worker" or "workman," and "operative" 
21 do not include an offender performing labor under Section 64-13-16 or 64-13-19, 
22 except as required by federal statute or regulation. 
23 as last amended by Chapters 106 and 130, Laws of Utah 1993 
24 
25 
26 
27 SECTION 35-1-90 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
28 
29 35-1-90. Void agreements between employers and employees. 
30 
31 No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation under this title 
32 shall be valid. No agreement by an employee to pay any portion of the premium 
33 paid by his employer shall be valid. Any employer who deducts any portion of 
34 such premium from the wages of salary of any employee entitled to the benefits of 
35 this title is guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be fined not more than $100 for 
36 each such offense. 
$7 No change since 1953 
14 
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any presumption that a legal duty has 
been breached. The Rules are designed 
to provide guidance to lawyers and to 
provide a structure for regulating con-
duct through disciplinary agencies. 
They are not designed to be a basis for 
civil liability. 
Accordingly, nothing in the Rule should 
be deemed to augment any substantive 
legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disci-
plinary consequences of violating such a 
duty. 
In the Terminology section, "partner" is 
defined as "[denoting] a member of a part-
nership and a shareholder in a law firm 
organized as a professional corporation." 
Rule 5.1 delineates the responsibilities of 
a partner or supervisory tewyer in Jaw 
firms and associations. Rule 5.1(a) states a 
partner's obligation is to ensure reasonable 
efforts are made to be sure that all lawyers 
within the firm conform to the Rules. 
Rule 5.1(b) specifically requires supervisory 
lawyers to make reasonable efforts to en-
sure those lawyers they supervise conform 
to the Rules. 
Rule 5.1(c) states: 
A lawyer shall be responsible for an-
other lawyer's violation of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct if: 
(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge 
of the specific conduct, ratifies the con-
duct involved; or 
(2) the lawyer is a partner in the law 
firm in which the other lawyer practic-
es, or has direct supervisory authority 
over the other lawyer, and knows of 
the conduct at a time when its conse-
quences can be avoided or mitigated 
but fails to take reasonable remedial 
action. 
The Comment to Rule 5.1 is also instruc-
tive. "Apart from this Rule and Rule 
8.4(a),2 a lawyer does not have disciplinary 
liability for the conduct of a partner, asso-
ciate or subordinate. Whether a lawyer 
may be liable civilly or criminally for anoth-
er lawyer's conduct is a question of law 
beyond the scope of these Rules." Clearly 
2. Rule 8.4(a): It is professional misconduct for 
a lawyer to: (a) Violate or attempt to violate the 
Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist 
the Utah Supreme Court is only concerned 
With potential disciplinary actions and has 
specifically refrained from addressing 
questions of civil liability. In regulating 
the practice of law, the Supreme Court has 
done nothing to change those principles of 
corporate law discussed earlier. 
The dismissal of the trial court is af-
firmed. Costs against plaintiffs. 
JACKSON and ORME, JJ., concur. 
Gilbert R. WILBURN, Plaintiff, 
v. 
INTERSTATE ELECTRIC, National Un-
ion Fire Insurance Company of Pitts-
burgh and Second Injury Fund, De-
fendants. 
No. 860292-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Jan. 19, 1988. 
Claimant appealed from a decision of 
the Industrial Commission that a compro-
mise and settlement agreement barred a 
claim for permanent total disability bene-
fits. The Court of Appeals, Orme, J., held 
that: (1) the agreement was ambiguous 
with respect to whether it released only 
claims for temporary total disability and 
permanent partial disability benefits, or 
whether it also released permanent total 
disability claims; (2) extrinsic evidence sup-
ported the conclusion that the claim for 
permanent total disability benefits was 
barred; (3) evidence supported the adminis-
trative law judge's finding that the parties 
had a good-faith dispute about the com-
pensability of the claim, so that the agree-
ment was enforceable; and (4) the Commis-
or induce another to do so, or do so through the 
acts of another. 
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•e appropriate only when compen-
ture of worker's injury is disputed 
ker's right to recover is doubtful; 
>mpensability of claim is not dis-
vorker cannot waive his claim by 
*nt. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-90. 
ters' Compensation <&»1157 
ficient evidence supported adminis-
law judge's finding that parties had 
ith dispute as to compensability of 
3' compensation claim and, there-
6. Workers' Compensation <3=>1124 
Industrial Commission should imple-
ment regulations governing settlement of 
claims to safeguard against abuses that 
might otherwise occur if unscrupulous em-
ployer or carrier attempts to take advan-
tage of unsophisticated worker seeking to 
settle claim without advice of counsel. 
U.C.A.1953, 35-1-10, 35-1-16, 35-1-
16(l)(e), 35-1-90. 
7. Workers' Compensation <s=>1138 
Industrial Commission's failure to 
adopt regular process for review and ap-
proval of settlements was not so arbitrary 
and capricious as to warrant reversal of 
decision that compromise and settlement 
agreement barred application for perma-
nent total disability benefits. U.C.A.1953, 
35-1-10, 35-1-16, 35-l-16(l)(e), 35-1-90. 
Michael E. Dyer, Stephanie A. Mallory 
(argued), Richards, Brandt, Miller & Nel-
son, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Stuart L. Poelman (argued), Snow, Chris-
tensen & Martineau, Salt Lake City, for 
Interstate Elec. & Nat'l Union. 
Erie V. Boorman (argued), Second Injury 
Fund, Salt Lake City. 
Before GARFF, JACKSON and 
ORME, JJ. 
OPINION 
ORME, Judge: 
Plaintiff Wilburn appeals from an Indus-
trial Commission order denying his applica-
tion for permanent total disability benefits 
under Utah's Workers' Compensation laws. 
The Commission's decision was premised 
on the ground that plaintiff had previously 
compromised and settled his claim. Plain-
tiff seeks reversal of the Commission's or-
der and an award of permanent total dis-
ability benefits. We affirm. 
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FACTS 
Plaintiff worked at Interstate Electric as 
a heavy duty mechanic repairing and over-
hauling portable power plants, water 
pumps, and hydraulic telephone pullers. 
On April 14, 1980, plaintiff injured his back 
while trying to lift a portable powerplant 
from the floor to his work bench. Plaintiff 
continued working the remainder of the 
day as well as the two following days. 
When the pain did not subside, he consult-
ed a doctor. After missing a few days of 
work, he continued working for the rest of 
the year with no other medical treatment. 
On February 2, 1981, Interstate Elec-
trics insurance carrier, defendant National 
Union, had plaintiff submit to an indepen-
dent physical examination, which resulted 
in a permanent partial impairment rating of 
20%. Fifteen percent of the impairment 
was attributable to preexisting causes, paid 
by the Second Injury Fund, and 5% attrib-
utable to aggravation of the preexisting 
condition by the industrial accident, paid by 
Interstate Electric. Plaintiff continued 
working until he was laid off on July 31, 
1981. Following another examination, he 
was placed on temporary total disability on 
August 18, 1981. On June 20, 1983, plain-
tiff was reexamined and received a perma-
nent partial impairment rating of 36%, with 
10% attributable to the industrial accident, 
15% to preexisting problems in his lumbar 
and lumbosacral spine, and 15% to a non-in-
dustrial cervical spine condition. 
In late 1983, plaintiff consulted an ad-
ministrative law judge who advised him to 
make a claim for permanent total disability. 
Plaintiff contacted Interstate Electric's 
carrier, asserted his claim, and was re-
ferred to the carrier's attorney. The attor-
ney told plaintiff that if he claimed perma-
nent total disability, Interstate Electric 
would raise several defenses, including the 
"no accident" defense, and if it prevailed, 
plaintiff would lose his claim for all addi-
tional compensation. Plaintiff then agreed 
to settle for an additional 10% permanent 
partial disability. Upon receiving a written 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement, 
plaintiff consulted with an Industrial Com-
mission attorney, and as a result, asked 
that the agreement contain an additional 
$1,590.00 for temporary total disability ben-
efits during the fall of 1983. The agree-
ment was revised as requested, signed by 
both parties, and approved by the Industri-
al Commission in November 1984. Defend-
ants then paid plaintiff as required in the 
agreement. 
Despite the agreement, in early 1986 
plaintiff filed an application with the Indus-
trial Commission seeking permanent total 
disability compensation from defendants. 
A hearing was held on the application and 
the administrative law judge issued his "In-
terim Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order" on May 28, 1986, in which he 
expressed "no doubt" as to the compensa-
bility of plaintiffs claim, found him to be 
permanently and totally disabled, and im-
posed liability for permanent total disabili-
ty upon defendants. Defendants filed a 
"Motion for Review and Clarification" and 
the administrative law judge then issued 
his "Supplemental Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law and Order," vacating his 
prior order. Specifically, the judge found 
that, while he would have held that Wil-
burn sustained a "compensable accident," 
there was a bona fide dispute as to defend-
ants' liability for plaintiffs alleged indus-
trial injury. The Compromise and Settle-
ment Agreement was therefore binding 
and barred plaintiffs claim for permanent 
total disability compensation. 
On appeal, plaintiff argues that he did 
not release his claim for permanent total 
disability benefits upon signing the Com-
promise and Settlement Agreement and, if 
his claim was released by the agreement, 
that the settlement was void as against 
public policy and in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-90 (1974). 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
We first address the issue of whether the 
agreement between the parties settled 
plaintiffs claim for permanent total disabil-
ity benefits. When a contract is unambig-
uous, its interpretation is a question of law. 
See, e.g., Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 
714, 716 (Utah 1985); Seashores Inc. v. 
Hancey, 738 P.2d 645 (Utah Ct.App.1987). 
WILBURN v. INTERSTATE ELEC. 
Cite as 748 VJA 582 (UtahApp. 1988) 
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If it is ambiguous,—and the determination 
of whether or not a contract is ambiguous 
is itself a question of law—extrinsic evi-
dence as to the parties' intent must be 
received and considered in an effort to gle-
an what the parties actually agreed to. 
Seashores Inc. v. Hancey, 738 P.2d at 647. 
If a trial court interprets a contract as a 
matter of law, on appeal the trial court's 
resolution is afforded no particular defer-
ence. Id. On the other hand, if the con-
tract is ambiguous and the trial forum 
finds facts respecting the intention of the 
parties based on extrinsic evidence, then 
appellate review is strictly limited and the 
findings and judgment of the trier will not 
be disturbed if based on substantial, com-
petent, admissible evidence. Id,; Utah 
R.Civ.P. 52. 
[1] Accordingly, we must first deter-
mine, as a matter of law, whether the con-
tract is ambiguous. Plaintiff argues that 
the Compromise and Settlement Agree-
ment is unambiguous in its release of only 
his claim for temporary total disability and 
permanent partial disability benefits since 
it does not specifically mention permanent 
total disability. The difficulty with this 
position is that the contract does not refer 
specifically even to the claims defendant 
concedes were released by the document. 
Thus, while it is clear the parties meant to 
settle something, it is unclear what claim 
or claims they meant to settle. 
1. Several Utah cases have invoked the doctrine 
but have typically not elaborated on its proper 
role. See, e.g., Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 
1105, 1107 (Utah 1982) ('The well-established 
rule in Utah is that any uncertainty with respect 
to construction of a contract should be resolved 
against the party who had drawn the agree-
ment."); Parks Enters., Inc. v. New Century Real-
ty, Inc., 652 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1982) ("It is also 
settled law that a contract will be construed 
against the drafter."); In re Estate of Orris, 622 
P.2d 337, 339 (Utah 1980) (language of an am-
biguous instrument should be construed most 
strictly against the party who drafted the instru-
ment). The case of Wells Fargo Bank v. Mid-
west Realty <fr Fin., Inc., 544 P.2d 882 (Utah 
1975), recognizes that where a document is am-
biguous, it is appropriate to construe it "strictly 
against the party who wrote it," but also appro-
priate to "take extraneous evidence and look to 
the total circumstances to determine what the 
Since the contract is ambiguous, it was 
appropriate for the administrative law 
judge to consider extrinsic evidence in an 
effort to find the intentions of the parties 
in entering into the agreement. Plaintiff 
argues, however, that the extrinsic evi-
dence in this case does not support a find-
ing that the agreement contemplated a re-
lease of his permanent total disability 
claim. In this regard, plaintiff urges appli-
cation of the doctrine that ambiguities in a 
contract should be construed against the 
party responsible for its drafting. 
A. Construction Against Drafter 
[2] Plaintiff misapprehends the doctrine 
that contracts should be construed against 
the drafter.1 The doctrine does not operate 
in dispositive fashion simply because ambi-
guity has been found. Once a contract is 
deemed ambiguous, the next order of busi-
ness is to admit extrinsic evidence to aid in 
interpretation of the contract. It is only 
after extrinsic evidence is considered and 
the court is still uncertain as to the inten-
tion of the parties that ambiguities should 
be construed against the drafter.2 In other 
words, the doctrine of construing ambigui-
ties in a contract against the drafter func-
tions as a kind of tie-breaker, used as a last 
resort by the fact-finder after the receipt 
and consideration of all pertinent extrinsic 
evidence has left unresolved what the par-
ties actually intended. This rule has been 
summarized as follows: 
parties should reasonably be deemed to have 
understood thereby." Id. at 885. While the 
opinion does not say so, it is obvious there is 
nothing left to construe—"strictly against the 
party who wrote it" or otherwise—if extraneous 
evidence clearly establishes "what the parties 
should reasonably be deemed to have under-
stood" in executing an agreement. 
2. There are arguable exceptions to this rule, 
including where insurance and surety contracts 
are concerned. See, e.g., Shelter America Corp. 
v. Ohio Cos. & Ins. Co., 745 P.2d 843 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1987). However, such exceptions may 
be explained, at least in part, by the fact that 
such contracts are ordinarily not preceded by 
discussion or negotiation of specific terms and, 
thus, absent meaningful extrinsic evidence as to 
intent, recourse must be had directly to the 
maxim that ambiguities should be construed 
against the drafter. 
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After applying all of the ordinary pro-
cesses of interpretation, including all ex-
isting usages, general, local, technical, 
trade, and the custom and agreement of 
the two parties with each other, having 
admitted in evidence and duly weighed 
all the relevant circumstances and com-
munications between the parties, there 
may still be doubt as to the meaning that 
should be given and made effective by 
the court. If . . . the remaining doubt as 
to the proper interpretation is merely as 
to which of two possible and reasonable 
meanings should be adopted, the court 
will adopt that one which is less favor-
able in its legal effect to the party who 
chose the words. 
3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 559 
(1960). 
B. Extrinsic Evidence 
[3] In this case, the judge received ex-
trinsic evidence, including testimony of the 
Commission's former legal counsel who ap-
proved the agreement, plaintiff's own testi-
mony, and other testimony on the circum-
stances surrounding the execution of the 
Compromise and Settlement Agreement, 
and concluded, as a matter of fact, that the 
agreement was validly executed by the par-
ties as a settlement of a disputed claim, 
including for permanent total disability 
benefits. Although the evidence was in 
conflict, ample evidence supports the 
judge's findings in this regard. 
Reviewing the record, we have some 
doubt about whether the decision reached 
by the judge was the fairest or the most 
appropriate in view of the extrinsic evi-
dence. However, our approval or disap-
proval of the substantive decision reached 
is largely irrelevant. "[W]e give maximum 
deference to the basic facts determined by 
the agency, which will be sustained if there 
is evidence of any substance that can be 
reasonably regarded as supporting the de-
termination made." Wilson v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 735 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah Ct.App. 
1987) (citing Allen & Assoc, v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 732 P.2d 508, 508-09 (Utah 
1987)). Deference, always due by appellate 
courts to fact-finders, is maximized where, 
as here, the Legislature has comprehen-
sively delegated responsibility over a par-
ticular subject to a specialized administra-
tive agency. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-16 
(1987). See, e.g., Department of Admin. 
Servs. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 658 P.2d 
601, 608-10 (Utah 1983); Central Bank & 
Trust Co. v. Brimhall, 28 Utah 2d 14, 16, 
497 P.2d 638, 641 (1972). 
SECTION 35-1-90 
Notwithstanding the ambiguity of the 
contract and the findings of the administra-
tive law judge, plaintiff argues that the 
agreement is nonetheless void as against 
public policy and in violation of § 35-1-90 
of Utah's Workers' Compensation statutes. 
Section 35-1-90 provides, in relevant part: 
"No agreement by an employee to waive 
his rights to compensation under this title 
shall be valid." Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-90 
(1974). 
[4] Under this provision, settlements 
are appropriate only when the compensable 
nature of the worker's injury is disputed 
and the worker's right to recover is doubt-
ful. See Brigham Young Univ. v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 74 Utah 349, 279 P. 889 
(1929). Conversely, when the compensabili-
ty of a workers' compensation claim is not 
disputed, an employee cannot waive his 
claim by agreement. Barber Asphalt 
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 103 Utah 
371, 135 P.2d 266 (1943). 
[5] The administrative law judge in this 
case focused on the effect of these two 
cases on plaintiff's claim and determined 
that the settlement should be enforced only 
if there had been a bona fide dispute as to 
the compensability of plaintiffs claim. 
Recognizing that the issue was not so 
much whether the judge believed the appli-
cant sustained a compensable accident as it 
was a matter of what the parties believed 
and acted upon, the administrative law 
judge reversed his initial, tentative decision 
and found that the Compromise and Settle-
ment Agreement was validly executed by 
the parties as a settlement of a disputed 
claim, including for permanent total disabil-
ity, and was not in violation of § 35-1-90. 
While we would have no difficulty in 
finding the applicant's claim compensable, 
WILBURN v. IN 
Cite as 748 P.2d • 
jree with the administrative law judge 
this determination cannot "supplant 
udgment of those who earlier, in good 
, viewed this claim as one of doubtful 
>ensability."3 Since there is sufficient 
mce to support the judge's finding that 
parties had a good faith dispute as to 
compensability of the claim, we defer to 
determination. In view of that find-
§ 35-1-90 is no bar to enforceability of 
agreement. 
TOWARDS A MORE REGULAR 
PROCEDURE 
5] We acknowledge, as did the admin-
ative law judge, the "harsh conse-
jnces" of this decision but agree that 
impassion for the Applicant does not jus-
f the erosion of a principle and policy 
rtaining to compensation agreements 
nerally." The parties tell us that it has 
en the policy of the Industrial Commis-
>n to encourage the settlement of claims 
id that it has been the practice of the 
>mmission to approve settlement agree-
ents before their execution. The Legisla-
te specifically granted to the Industrial 
ommission the power and authority to 
romote the expedited resolution of claims 
nder the Workers' Compensation statutes, 
lection 35-1-16 provides: 
It shall be the duty of the commission, 
and it shall have full power, jurisdiction, 
and authority: 
(5) To promote the voluntary arbitration, 
mediation and conciliation of disputes be-
tween employers and employees.4 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-16 (1974). 
The Commission is likewise vested with 
the authority to promulgate rules for gov-
3. Interstate Electric's argument about the "com-
pensability" of Wilburn's claim was not alto-
gether implausible given the state of flux sur-
rounding the definition of "accident" at the time 
plaintiffs claim was filed. See, e.g., Allen v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). 
4. Subsequent legislation has changed the format 
of, but not the language quoted from, 
§ 35-1-16. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-16(l)(e) 
(1987). 
3. The Commission has developed a "Compensa-
tion Agreement" form. "This form is used by 
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erning these procedures. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 35-1-10 (1974). Clearly, then, the Com-
mission has the prerogative to adopt regu-
lations governing the settlement of claims. 
Implicit in the Commission's practice of 
reviewing proposed settlements is the con-
comitant responsibility of the Commission 
to assure that an applicant is aware of the 
scope and consequences of his or her settle-
ment agreement. Moreover, when impor-
tant rights are at issue, they should not be 
left to the vagaries of self-serving recall. 
If it is true, as defendants suggest, that 
the Industrial Commission approves as 
many as fifty of these settlements a year, 
then the Commission should implement a 
process which will operate, as the adminis-
trative law judge stated, to "safeguard 
against abuses that might otherwise occur, 
if an unscrupulous employer or insurance 
carrier attempts] to take advantage of an 
unsophisticated worker seeking to settle a 
claim without the advice of counsel." 
[7] It seems to us that the Commission 
should formalize its long-standing practice 
of getting involved in the settlement of 
claims. Pursuant to its rule making au-
thority, the Commission should adopt pro-
cedures defining its role in settlements. To 
help avoid disputes like the instant one, it 
might, by rule, require the use of a stan-
dard, unambiguous form specifically delin-
eating which claims are released and 
which, if any, are preserved by the agree-
ment6 While such a regularized process 
of review and approval of settlements by 
the Commission seems clearly preferable, 
we cannot say the failure heretofore to 
have adopted such a process is so arbitrary 
the parties to a workers' compensation claim to 
enter into an agreement as to a permanent par-
tial impairment award, and must be submitted 
to the Commission for approval." Workers' 
Compensation Rules and Regulations 
§ R490-1-2(P) (effective March 4, 1986, as 
amended). The "Compensation Agreement," the 
Commission's Form 019, is used in situations 
where there is no dispute about the occurrence 
or compensability of an accident to document 
that a claimant "accepts the compensation and 
Medical payments paid to date and agrees with 
the permanent partial disability rating shown 
above." 
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and capricious as to warrant reversal in 
this case. 
The Industrial Commission's order is af-
firmed. 
GARFF and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
In the Matter of the Adoption of K.O., 
aka K.D., a minor, 
v. 
Helen DENISON, Petitioner 
and Appellant. 
No. 870246-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Jan. 21, 1988. 
Natural grandmother of child sought 
to vacate adoption of child. The First Dis-
trict Court, Cache County, Omer J. Call, J., 
granted adoptive parent's motion for sum-
mary judgment, and grandmother appeal-
ed. The Court of Appeals, Davidson, J., 
held that: (1) remand was necessary, as 
trial court decided summary judgment mo-
tion before grandmother's time to answer 
motion had expired; (2) material issue of 
fact existed as to whether adoptive parents 
were residents of state at time of filing 
petition for adoption; and (3) grandmother 
was entitled to notice of adoption proceed-
ings and opportunity to establish and en-
force her rights in child. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Appeal and Error e»1073(l) 
Remand of grant of summary judg-
ment motion was required, as court grant-
ed motion two days before expiration of 
nonmovant's time to answer motion. 
2. Judgment <3=>185.3(9) 
Material issue of fact existed as to 
legal residence of adoptive parents at time 
of adoption, precluding summary judgment 
in grandmother's action to vacate adoption; 
adoption petition was filed in November 
and affidavit of division of family services 
representative stated that adoptive parents 
moved out of jurisdiction in September. 
U.C.A.1953, 20-2-14, 78-30-7. 
3. Adoption <s=»12 
Natural grandmother of child was enti-
tled to notice of adoption and an opportuni-
ty to establish and enforce her rights as to 
child; grandmother had taken care of child 
since birth. 
Anne Milne, Utah Legal Services, Inc., 
M. David Eckersley (Argued), Houpt & 
Eckersley, Salt Lake City, for petitioner 
and appellant. 
Marlin J. Grant (Argued), Olson & Hog-
gan, Logan, for respondents (Adoptive Par-
ents). 
Before BENCH, ORME and 
DAVIDSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Petitioner Helen Denison appeals from 
an order of summary judgment which de-
nied a motion to set aside her grandson's 
adoption and also denied her motion for 
continuance to permit discovery. 
Petitioner is the natural grandmother of 
the child at issue who was born on August 
10, 1977. Approximately six years after 
the child's birth, the parental rights of the 
natural parents were terminated by order 
of the Second District Juvenile Court. Af-
ter having been under the primary care of 
petitioner from birth until the adoption 
placement, the child was placed with the 
Division of Family Services for placement 
in a suitable adoptive home. On April 23, 
1984, the Division of Family Services 
placed the child in the home of Mr. & Mrs. 
W (the W's) who, at that time, were resi-
dents of Cache County, Utah. On Septem-
STATE, ETC. v. UTAH M 
Cite as, Utah, 
Likewise in Home Builders Association of 
Greater Kansas City v. City of Kansas 
City,1 the Missouri Supreme Court held: 
if the burden cast upon the 
subdivider is reasonably attributable to 
his activity, then the requirement [of ded-
ication or fees in lieu thereof] is permissi-
ble; if not, it is forbidden and amounts to 
a confiscation of private property in con-
travention of the constitutional prohibi-
tions rather than reasonable regulation 
under the police power. Insofar as the 
establishment of a subdivision within a 
city increases the recreational needs of 
the city, then to that extent the cost of 
meeting that increase indeed may reason-
ably be required of the subdivider. (Em-
phasis in original.) 
In this case the rule adopted by this 
Court in Call J, quoted antey cannot be 
applied without plaintiffs being given the 
opportunity to present evidence to show 
that the dedication required of them had no 
reasonable relationship to the needs for 
flood control or parks and recreation facili-
ties created by their subdivision, if any. 
Implicit in this rule is the requirement that 
if the subdivision generates such needs and 
West Jordan exacts the fee in lieu of dedi-
cation, it is only fair that the fee so collect-
ed be used in such a way as to benefit 
demonstrably the subdivision in question. 
This is not to say that the benefit must be 
solely to the particular subdivision, but only 
that there be some demonstrable benefit to 
it. 
Reversed and remanded for further pro-
ceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
No costs awarded. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, 
HALL and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
ERIT SYSTEM COUNCIL Utah 1259 
614P.2d 1259 
STATE of Utah, By and Through the DE-
PARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AF-
FAIRS, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
UTAH MERIT SYSTEM COUNCIL and 
William A. Callahan, Defendants 
and Appellant 
No. 16501. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 3, 1980. 
State sought review of a decision of the 
Merit System Council ordering the reem-
ployment of an employee of the Depart-
ment of Community Affairs. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal 
Taylor, J., reversed, and remanded to the 
Council to hold a new hearing. Employee 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., 
held that the exclusion of the director of 
the Department of Community Affairs 
from a portion of the administrative hear-
ing because she was a witness in the pro-
ceeding was reversible error and the attend-
ance by a deputy director, who directed 
another arm of the operation and lacked 
full knowledge of the case, was not suffi-
cient to provide the Department with ap-
propriate representation. 
Affirmed. 
1. Officers and Public Employees <&=»72(1) 
Both parties to proceeding before Merit 
System Council were entitled to have testi-
mony taken under oath or affirmation. 
2. Officers and Public Employees <s=>72(2) 
Failure to place witnesses before Merit 
System Council under oath was not revers-
ibly erroneous where no objection was 
raised until State sought review of Council 
order in district court. 
3. Officers and Public Employees <s=*72(2) 
Omissions from record of proceeding 
before Merit System Council were not re-
7. 555 S.W.2d 832, 835 (Mo. 1977). 
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versibly erroneous where affidavits were 
received to cure those omissions in record 
and no claim was made that affidavits were 
in error on any material issue. 
4. Officers and Public Employees <s=»72(l, 
2) 
In proceeding before Merit System 
Council to review dismissal of agency em-
ployee, exclusion of director of agency from 
portion of administrative hearing because 
she was witness in proceeding was revers-
ibly erroneous and attendance by deputy 
agency director, who directed another arm 
of operation and lacked full knowledge of 
case, was not sufficient to provide agency 
with appropriate representation. 
5. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<s=>469 
Administrative hearings need not have 
all of the formality of judicial procedure 
and degree of formality may depend upon 
nature of administrative proceeding. 
6. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<s=*391, 416 
Administrative regulations are pre-
sumed to be reasonable and valid and can-
not be ignored or followed by agency to suit 
its own purposes, and agency must be held 
to those regulations without compelling 
ground for not following them. 
J. Francis Valerga, Salt Lake City, for 
Callahan. 
Anthony L. Rampton of Fabian & 
Clendenin, Salt Lake City, for Utah Merit 
System. 
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., James L. 
Barker, Stephen G. Schwendiman, Asst. At-
tys. Gen., Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
1. The record fails to establish that defendant 
falls within the statutory protection for merit 
system employees. Defendant was director of 
an agency within the Department of Communi-
ty Affairs, yet his duties were not sufficiently 
set forth to allow a determination, nor were 
any facts presented to establish, whether he 
may be exempt under Utah Code Ann. § 67-
13-6(a)(4) (1953), as amended. If such exemp-
tion exists in this case, there was no showing 
that the administrative hearing process before 
STEWART, Justice: 
Defendant William Callahan was termi-
nated as an employee of the Department of 
Community Affairs. The Utah Merit Sys-
tem Council ordered his reemployment. 
The State of Utah sought review in a dis-
trict court which reversed and remanded. 
The district court directed the Council to 
hold a new hearing on the ground that 
three procedural errors had been committed 
during the hearing before the Merit System 
Council, i. e., failure to place witnesses un-
der oath, failure to maintain a complete 
record of the testimony adduced, and exclu-
sion of a party to the action from the 
proceedings. Callahan now appeals from 
the district court order setting aside the 
decision of the Utah Merit Council. Calla-
han urges on appeal that none of the 
grounds relied on by the district court justi-
fies a new hearing before the Merit Coun-
cil.1 
Defendant Callahan was director of the 
Housing Development Agency in the De-
partment of Community Affairs. The 
grounds stated for his termination were 
lack of support for administrative policy, 
insubordination, inefficiency, disloyalty, and 
nonfeasance in performance of his duties. 
Defendant appealed the decision to the 
Utah Merit System Council. The hearing 
lasted an entire day and generated a record 
consisting of a 135-page transcript. Al-
though Beth Jarman, the Director of the 
Department, was absent from part or all of 
the proceedings, the deputy director of that 
department was present during the hearing. 
The Merit Council found that defendant's 
performance as an employee of the Depart-
ment of Community Affairs had been "for 
the Merit Council was still available to defend-
ant. At the time of defendant's hearings before 
the Merit Council (October 30, 1978, and De-
cember 12, 1978) Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-13-1 
to 67-13-15 (1953), as amended, was the appli-
cable law. The Merit System Act contained 
therein has been repealed and superseded by 
the Utah State Personnel Management Act, 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-19-1 to 67-19-29 
(1953), as amended, which became effective 
July 1, 1979. 
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the most part, of a very high quality," and 
that the "immediate cause of his termina-
tion appears to be more of a personality 
conflict between the appellant and his im-
mediate supervisor than with his job per-
formance." Finding the reasons asserted 
for the dismissal not adequately supported 
by the evidence, the Merit Council unani-
mously ordered the defendant to be rein-
stated. The State filed a petition in the 
district court pursuant to Rule 65B,2 Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, to review the Mer-
it Council order. 
[1] On this appeal defendant contends 
the district court erred in holding that the 
three above-mentioned procedural defects 
in the administrative hearing constituted 
reversible error. The first contention is 
that the lower court erred in ruling that the 
Merit Council's failure to swear witnesses 
prior to presenting testimony was prejudi-
cial error. Clearly both parties to this pro-
ceeding were entitled to have the testimony 
under oath or affirmation. Retention of a 
job is a legally-protected interest, e. g., 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 
S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Perry v. 
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 
L.Ed.2d 570 (1972), and loss of a job should 
not be countenanced on the basis of state-
ments made by fellow employees not under 
oath. On the other hand, the State also has 
a legitimate interest in the integrity of a 
proceeding to determine job retention. The 
public service is indeed a public trust, and 
retention of unfit public employees is inimi-
cal to the public interest. At the least a 
witness who testifies under oath is likely to 
be more deliberate and careful in the state-
ments he makes because of the knowledge 
that an unbridled tongue may lead to legal 
sanctions. Both the State and the employ-
ee are therefore entitled to have witnesses 
placed under oath in a retention proceeding. 
[2] At the first administrative hearing, 
plaintiff inquired whether there was a pro-
cedure for swearing in the witnesses. 
Plaintiff did not object to the failure to 
2. The appropriateness of challenging the Merit 
System Council's order by extraordinary writ 
in the district court was not raised in this case. 
administer an oath and simply responded to 
the negative response by calling his first 
witness. The first time the objection was 
raised was on review in the district court. 
Because no timely objection was made in 
the administrative hearing, the matter was 
not appropriately raised before the district 
court. Cf. Rule 46, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Sanders v. Cassity, Utah, 586 
P.2d 423 (1978); Steele v. Wilkinson, 10 
Utah 2d 159, 349 P.2d 1117 (1966); Pettin-
gill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P.2d 185 
(1954). See Wilcoxon v. United States, 231 
F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1956), specifically hold-
ing that the requirement of an oath is 
waived by the absence of a timely objection. 
Therefore the Merit Council proceedings 
were not defective for failing to administer 
the oath. 
[3] The district court also reversed be-
cause of an omission in the record of a 
discussion which occurred prior to the re-
cording of the proceedings. The affidavit 
of the executive secretary of the Merit 
Council confirms the Merit Council's posi-
tion that the only matter discussed prior to 
the recording of the proceedings was 
whether the hearing should be postponed or 
should proceed with just a quorum present. 
The record was also considered deficient by 
the State due to the loss of the record of 
the testimony of Lois Strand, which appar-
ently resulted from a tape recorder mal-
functioning. Two affidavits, one by Lois 
Strand, the witness whose testimony was 
not recorded, and the other by counsel for 
the State, summarized the testimony. 
These corrections sufficiently cured the de-
fect in this case in view oif the fact that no 
claim is made that the affidavits are in 
error on any material issue. Waterman v. 
State, 35 Misc.2d 954, 232 N.Y.S.2d 22 
(1962). 
Finally, the district court held that the 
exclusion of a witness, Beth Jarman, the 
Director of the State agency, from a por-
tion of the administrative hearing was re-
versible error. We agree. Exclusion of 
The issue was not presented to this Court and 
therefore is not addressed in this decision. 
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witnesses is a practice designed to prevent a 
person's testimony from being influenced 
by the testimony given by other witnesses. 
Taylor v. United States, 388 F.2d 786 (9th 
Cir. 1967). The time-honored practice in 
judicial proceedings is codified in Rule 43(f), 
U.R.C.P, providing: 
Upon motion of either party, the court 
shall exclude from the courtroom any 
witness of the adverse party, not at the 
time under examination, so that he may 
not hear the testimony of the other wit-
nesses.3 
[4] Statutes in a number of jurisdictions 
establish the right of a party to an action to 
remain in attendance during the entire tri-
al.4 Our rule is silent on that issue. In 
some cases there may be reason to differen-
tiate between administrative and judicial 
proceedings, but in this case we hold that 
the State's personal representative was not 
subject to exclusion.5 Cf. 6 Wigmore on 
Evidence § 1841 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976); 
75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 62 (1974). This con-
clusion is based on the proposition that a 
party's presence at the proceedings may be 
essential in assisting in the presentation of 
its case and otherwise protecting its inter-
ests by observing the conduct of the trial. 
The necessity of preserving fundamental 
requirements of procedural fairness in ad-
ministrative hearings was stated in Inter-
state Commerce Commission v. Louisville & 
Nashville R. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93, 33 S.Ct. 
185, 187, 57 L.Ed. 431 (1913): 
The Commission is an administrative 
body and, even where it acts in a quasi-
jud'w'm} capacity, is not limited by the 
strict rules, as to the admissibility of evi-
dence, which prevail in suits between pri-
vate parties. Int. Com. Comm. v. Baird, 
194 U.S. 25, [24 S.Ct. 563, 48 L.Ed. 860J. 
But the more liberal the practice in ad-
mitting testimony, the more imperative 
the obligation to preserve the essential 
3. Whereas Rule 43(f) provides mandatory ex-
clusion on motions, U.C.A. § 78-7-4 (1953), as 
amended, provides the court with a discretion-
ary power to exclude witnesses from hearing 
testimony of others. 
rules of evidence by which rights are 
1 asserted or defended. In such cases the 
i Commissioners cannot act upon their own 
i information as could jurors in primitive 
i days. All parties must be fully apprised 
>, of the evidence submitted or to be con-
sidered, and must be given opportunity to 
 cross-examine witnesses, to inspect docu-
ments and to offer evidence in explana-
tion or rebuttal. In no other way can a 
party maintain its rights or make its de-
fense. In no other way can it test the 
sufficiency of the facts to support the 
s finding . . . . 
0 [5] We recognize that administrative 
hearings need not have all the formality of 
 judicial procedure and that the degree of 
formality may depend on the nature of the 
1 administrative proceeding. We also recog-
t nize that the person excluded was a repre-
t sentative of the State. Because govern-
i mental entities and private citizens are not 
; on an equal footing as to constitutional 
prohibitions and because an arm of the 
i State is involved herein, the constitutional 
* requirements of due process do not apply to 
f the State as they would to a private citizen. 
Yet in this case, the State, in accordance 
with the Merit Council procedural rules and 
1 because of the nature of the case involved, 
should also be allowed to have its represent-
ative in attendance at the Council hearing 
\ in order to present, or assist in presenting, 
the State's case in chief and rebuttal evi-
dence, and to conduct or assist in conduct-
j ing Cross-examination to assure an accurate 
and complete disclosure of the facts. See 
} Entrc Nous Club v. Toronto, 4 Utah 2d 98, 
\ 287 P.2d 670 (1955); 2 Am.Jur.2d Adminis-
trative Law § 397 (1962). 
The question of whether the director of 
the plaintiff agency was actually a party to 
the proceedings which heard defendant's 
appeal and thus entitled to be present is 
answered in the affirmative by the Merit 
4. Compare, e. g., Tennessee Code § 24-106 
(1955); Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 
267; Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 615. 
5. A party litigant who is also a witness may be 
requested to testify first. See Moore v. Cham-
bers, Miss., 199 So.2d 261 (1967). 
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System Council's procedural rules. The 
Merit System Procedures, Article III, § 2, 
H 2b(3)-2b(3Xd) provide: 
(3) At the close of the agency representa-
tive's oral statements and the testimony 
or evidence offered by agency witnesses, 
questions may be directed to the repre-
sentative and each witness by interested 
parties. Interested Parties are as fol-
lows, and they shall raise questions in the 
order named and at times called upon by 
the chairman. 
(a) The agency representative, on the tes-
timony and evidence of agency witnesses; 
and agency witnesses, on the testimony 
and evidence of the representative and of 
each other witness. 
(b) The appellant, on the testimony and 
evidence offered by the agency represent-
ative and each agency witness. Ques-
tions of the appellant at this point should 
be aimed at focusing the attention of the 
Council on what he considers to be weak-
nesses of the agency's position or on 
points that he will make later when 
presenting his case. This is not the prop-
er place for rebuttal or counter argu-
ments. 
(c) The Merit System Director, on the 
testimony and evidence of the agency 
representative and each agency witness. 
(d) Council, on the testimony of and evi-
dence offered by the agency representa-
tive and each witness. [Emphasis added.] 
Article III, § 2, 12(c) provides an identical 
procedure for the opposition: 
(c) Presentation of the appellant's case— 
The procedure here shall be exactly the 
same as that for presentation of the case 
of the agency except that the roles of the 
agency representative and witnesses and 
those of the appellant and his witnesses 
shall be reversed. 
[6] No agency representative with full 
knowledge of the case was present at the 
proceedings to propose questions. The 
Council cannot violate its own procedural 
rules by denying an appropriate agency rep-
resentative access to the proceedings. See 
Gardner v. F.C.C., 530 F.2d 1086 (D.C.Cir. 
1976); Palmer v. Weinberger, 396 F.Supp. 
654 (W.D.N.Y.1975); United States v. RCA 
Alaska Communications, Inc., Alaska, 597 
P.2d 489 (1978); and Moore v. Oregon State 
Penitentiary Corrections Div., 16 Or.App. 
536, 519 P.2d 389 (1974). Defendants con-
tend that the procedural rules are merely 
"guidelines," but administrative regulations 
are presumed to be reasonable and valid 
and cannot be ignored or followed by the 
agency to suit its own purposes. Such is 
the essence of arbitrary and capricious ac-
tion. Without compelling grounds for not 
following its rules, an agency must be held 
to them. See Bess v. Park, 144 Cal.App.2d 
798, 301 P.2d 978 (1956); Augustin v. 
Barnes, 41 Colo.App. 533, 592 P.2d 9 (1978); 
State v. Parham, Okl., 412 P.2d 142 (1966); 
and Lumpkin v. Dept. of Social & Health 
Services, 20 Wash.App. 406, 581 P.2d 1060 
(1978). The attendance by Deputy Director 
Grundfossen, an ad hoc representative who 
directed another arm of the operation and 
lacked full knowledge of the instant case, 
was not sufficient to provide the agency 
with appropriate representation.6 
The judgment of the trial court is af-
firmed. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS, MAU-
GHAN and HALL, JJ., concur. 
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6. The deputy director's presence could have 
been sufficient had he been properly designated 
by the appropriate party as its representative. 
